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Abstract
Data ownership is of fundamental importance in the digital economy of today. Com-
mercializing academic research, whilst maintaining ownership of it, is a task that can
now be accomplished due to the strengths of blockchain technology, which allows
data to be registered, made unique, and traced to its origins.
We propose a blockchain use-case for licencing academic research, based off an aca-
demic project named UniCoin.
In this thesis, we discuss how to fairly attribute credit between all sources of knowl-
edge that contribute to new pieces of academic research, using citation network
analysis and centrality measures. Katz centrality, in-degree centrality, and PageR-
ank are three potentially useful centrality measures, with varying results: these are
compared using case studies based on three papers co-authored by Andrei Shleifer.
We use these centrality measures to guide how to fairly attribute credit, and thus
how to distribute licencing revenues generated through UniCoin.
Keywords : credit diffusion, citation networks, blockchain, research marketplace.
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1 Introduction
This thesis discusses the allocation of credit between academic papers, aided by the
construction of a citation network and a potential blockchain-based credit allocation
system. The thesis is born from an academic project called UniCoin1, a decentralized
smart contract-based non-custodial research marketplace which allows academics to
benefit from commercially viable research. The aims of UniCoin are a) to allow
researchers to sell licences to intellectual property, and b) ensure that any funds
received are distributed fairly. In this paper we extend on this project by further
investigating how to fairly attribute credit between all those who contribute to a
paper, to guide how to distribute licencing revenue. This research is done in parallel
to research by Maree (2020), who investigates the former aim of UniCoin.
There are at least two sources of knowledge that result in the creation of a published
work – the authors of that work, and all authors cited within it. Researchers cus-
tomarily cite all published works they use while writing a paper. All academics who
significantly contribute to the paper are listed as authors. It is common for papers
to be authored by multiple academics, and for papers to include many cited works
as references – as noted by Fang (2018), references serve as a useful way to help
convince readers that a paper’s argument is sound, and including multiple reputable
references helps a paper do this well.
The literature has done significant work with citation and authorship networks.
Kim and Diesner (2014), and Tol (2011) discuss the allocation of credit between
co-authors – how to attribute credit between those who authored it, in a fair way
which benefits those who contributed the most. The issue of diffusion of credit in a
citation network, acknowledging the papers that contributed to another paper, has
also been discussed (see Radicchi et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (2016)). Significantly
1http://unicoin.win
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less work, however, has been done into a combination of the two – how to allocate
credit fairly between all contributors, acknowledging the value added by a co-author
as well as the existing knowledge provided by a cited work. Fang (2018) proposes
a framework to do this, which has not yet been implemented empirically, but will
be discussed. Additionally, we discuss how credit can be given to third parties who
would not previously acknowledged, such as lab assistants.
We use centrality measures in citation networks to guide how to allocate credit be-
tween papers cited by a paper, and discuss how to allocate credit between cited
papers and the authors of the original paper. We discuss how a blockchain-based
platform could be developed to enable researchers to licence their work while re-
taining ownership of it, and ensure that licencing revenues are distributed fairly. To
test the framework empirically, we use three papers authored (in part) by Andrei
Shleifer to visualise the results of this allocation.
2
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2 Academic norms and measuring impact
In academic writing, it is the norm to recognize prior work upon which one’s writ-
ing depends, through citing that work. Gilbert (1977) argues that the award of a
citation is more than recognizing the property rights of other academics, but is a
function of persuading readers that one’s argument is valid. Academic writing that
furthers existing research can trust that the prior research is true, and use it as
the foundation of a new argument, demonstrating the novelty of the new research
and how the authors are contributing to the academic landscape. Or, authors can
use citations to justify their positions or statements, strengthening their argument
through substantiation from a trusted source (Gilbert, 1977).
The ‘trusted’ nature of the source is critical to ensuring that the resulting argument
is accepted as valid, and citing respectable sources adds more value than irrelevant
or untrustworthy sources. Indeed, one function of a peer-reviewed journal is to
establish the trustworthiness of the research published therein.
Moreover, the awarding of a citation to a published work can also be seen as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, in that by awarding a paper a citation, one is recognizing that it
is a trusted and esteemed source, but also making it more trusted and esteemed. In
this sense, the number of citations a paper or academic has received is seen as a proxy
for the scientific impact that they have. Many papers have been written attempting
to quantify the impact of an academic or a paper through the number of citations
they have received - introducing measures such as the significant h-index due to
Hirsch (2005), the g-index due to Egghe (2006), and more recently the Euclidian
index due to Perry and Reny (2016)2 and the A-index due to Stallings et al. (2013),
amongst others.
2Notably, the inspiration for the title of this thesis.
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These indices aim to summarize a researcher’s academic track record with some
numerical score. For instance, the h-index tells us that a researcher with a score
of h has at least h publications which have received at least h citations (Hirsch,
2005), whereas the g-index tells us that a researcher with a score of g has at least g
publications with a sum of at least g2 citations between them (Egghe, 2006). The
varying definitions of each index can result in varying rankings when applied to a set
of researchers, as demonstrated by each of the papers above introducing the indices,
but they all have in common that they use citations as an input for measuring
impact.
Additionally, centrality measures have also been applied to citation networks. In
network theory, centrality measures relate a given node to their role in the entire
network (Jackson, 2010) - one simple example being degree centrality, which mea-
sures how well a given node is connected to other nodes. Other measures, such as
the Bonacich network centrality measure, use the structure of the citation network
to determine who the most important players are - it turns out these are the players
who are connected to the most important players (West et al., 2010). In a citation
network, this makes sense - if a paper is cited by many important papers, then it is
surely also an important paper. Similarly to the Bonacich measure, both Google’s
PageRank algorithm due to Page et al. (1999) and the Eigenfactor metric due to
West et al. (2010) use the concept of eigenvector centrality to determine impact.
Where the Eigenfactor metric was initially developed to rank journals, providing an
index online at http://eigenfactor.org, it has been adapted to an article level.
Index-based measures of impact, due to their definitions, discard a lot of information.
For instance, we defined the h-index above - it only considers h of an academic’s
n potential publications, and has many shortcomings. An example that illustrates
this is a researcher with a few papers that are cited to a much higher degree than
4
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the rest of their papers - suppose they have 20 papers with 20 citations each, but
5 with 200 citations. Their h-index will be limited to 20, significantly lower than it
perhaps should be (Stallings et al., 2013). Young researchers, with very few papers,
will also be disadvantaged - if someone has only two papers, but each has received
many citations, their h-index will be only two.
For this reason, and due to the fact that these indices are commonly applied to
researchers rather than on a paper-level, we rather look closer at centrality measures
in this paper.
2.1 Centrality as a proxy for impact
There are many measures of centrality, each of which captures slightly different in-
formation, and as such, the use of such a measure should be justified by the context.
Degree centrality, mentioned above, captures only how many nodes a node is con-
nected to, but not the importance of those nodes. Closeness centrality measures how
close a node is to other nodes in the network, and betweenness centrality measures
how central a node is in terms of connecting other nodes (Jackson, 2010). All three
of these measures are fairly simple to calculate and can give good insights into the
structure of a network.
As we have already mentioned, in a citation network, the importance of a paper
should be determined by the importance of the papers which cite it, and this simple
motivation leads us to look more closely at the following few centrality measures.
Citation networks have some interesting properties. Where co-authorship networks
represent authors as nodes, we represent papers as nodes. Firstly, these networks
are dynamic, can only increase in size over time (Portenoy et al., 2017), and have
directed edges. An edge illustrating that paper A cites paper B means it is (almost)
5
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impossible3 for paper B to cite paper A - these networks are acyclic. An edge is
represented by gij ∈ {0, 1} where
gij =
1 if j cites i0 otherwise
An adjacency matrix G has gij in the (i, j)-th position. In an undirected network,
this would be a symmetric matrix, and gij would be 1 simply if there was an edge
between the two nodes. Gk is the k-th power of G and consists of elements g
[k]
ij , the
number of walks of length k from i to j.





Figure 1: An example citation network.
Here, P1 cites P2, P3, and P4. P3 cites P4, and P4 cites P5. The adjacency matrix is:
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0

3Whilst not technically impossible, it is very rare for this to occur, unless two papers are
published in a collaboration.
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There are many ways to analyse such a network to determine the most important
nodes. One very simple centrality measure is in-degree centrality: the number of
in-edges (citations), normalized by the maximum possible degree. Where d∗i (g) is
the number of in-edges of paper g, the in-degree centrality is thus d∗i (g)/(n − 1) in
a network with n nodes.
Whilst the number of edges linked to a node may well be a good indication of the
importance of that node, a few measures take this concept further, and say that
what is more important is the type of nodes which are linking to a node.
The Katz prestige draws on the idea that a node’s centrality, or importance, should
be influenced by the importance of the nodes it is connected to, and the Katz prestige
of a node is defined at the sum of its neighbours’ Katz prestiges, divided by their







Such a measure makes sense in the application of citation networks: a paper’s pres-
tige is influenced by the prestige of its citing papers, but to a lesser degree by a
given paper if that paper cites many papers. The above can be rewritten as
PK(g) = ĝPK(g)⇒ (I− ĝ)PK(g) = 0
Where I is the identity matrix and ĝ is the matrix of adjacencies scaled by their de-
grees, that is ĝij =
gij
dj(g)
. So, solving for the Katz prestiges of a network corresponds
to solving for the unit eigenvector of ĝ.
Bonacich extended on this, proposing that the centrality of a paper should be pro-
portional to the centrality of the nodes it is connected to (Jackson, 2010), through
finding the eigenvector of the unscaled matrix g. Where Ce(g) is the eigenvector
7
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In matrix notation we can write λCe(g) = gCe(g). That is, Ce(g) is an eigenvector of
g, and λ is its eigenvalue (Jackson, 2010) - generally the largest eigenvector is taken.
So, Katz prestige is a form of eigenvector centrality where the network adjacency
matrix has been adjusted.
A third formulation can also be considered, where the prestige of a node is a function
of the walks that emanate from it - weighted in terms of the length of the walk. That





Here, a is some small decay factor, and this reduces the contributing weight of longer





ij , a weighted sum
of the paths from node i to j.
The Bonacich centrality of node i is then defined as bi(g, a) =
∑n
j=1mij(g, a), that
is, the total number of (weighted) paths that emanate from i (Ballester et al., 2006).
This is sometimes referred to as Katz-Bonacich centrality, as in Bloch et al. (2016),
and sometimes as Katz Centrality, as in Newman (2010). To maintain consistency
with the software we later use, we refer to it in this paper as Katz Centrality.
In matrix notation, this can be written
b(g, a) = [I− aG]−1 · 1
Katz centrality discounts paths in proportion to their length. In citation networks,
this makes sense: in Figure 1, P3 should pass more influence to P4 than it passes
to P5.
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Katz prestige and Katz centrality are both variants of eigenvector centrality. One
further variant that can be considered in citation networks is PageRank due to Page
et al. (1999). PageRank was famously the originating concept behind Google, and
drives how web pages are ordered in search results. Just as a website can be viewed
as important if it has many ‘backlinks’ (that is, in-edges - pages that link to that
page), an academic paper is important if it has many citations. PageRank also
incorporates the notion that an in-edge from an important node should be more
important than many in-edges from obscure nodes.
Where Nu is the number of links from paper u, and Bu is the set of pages that link






Here, c is a normalization factor to ensure “the total rank of all webpages is constant”
(Page et al., 1999).
The full PageRank algorithm models the behaviour of a random surfer. An internet
user follows a walk of links between webpages, randomly clicking on one on each
page. However, with some probability they will break out of this cycle and choose
a new random page to visit. The probability that a user continues in the walk is
referred to as the damping factor. Ultimately, the final ranking given to a node
will correspond to the probability “that a random walk will be at that node after a
sufficiently long time” (Page et al., 1999).
So, we have discussed a few centrality measures - ways to determine which are the
most ‘important’ nodes in a network, and in our context, which papers should receive
a higher amount of credit in a flow of credit from another paper. Once that credit is
allocated to a paper, the next decision is how to allocate credit amongst its authors.
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2.2 Accounting for co-authorship
From the perspective of the cited paper, receiving many citations is a sign of impact,
whereas from the perspective of the citing paper, the awarding of a citation is to
pay homage to the intellectual heritage of the citing paper and recognize the impact
of the cited paper (Kostoff, 1998). On a more local scale, authorship is awarded to
recognize the role played by academics in the writing of a paper.
Across disciplines, collaboration is increasingly common, and this poses a problem
when attempting to fairly distribute credit in a citation network. If a portion of
credit is allocated to a paper, it still needs to be determined how best to allocate
this amongst the paper’s co-authors.
A few potential solutions exist. The first is the egalitarian option: to share credit
equally, claiming it isn’t possible to determine the proportions in which each author
contributed. This approach does introduce problems and can benefit secondary
authors to the detriment of primary authors (Kim and Diesner, 2014).
Alternative counting methods have been introduced so as to counteract this, which
allocate a decreasing amount of credit to authors as their position in the ordering of
authors decreases (rank weights). These approaches assume that authors are listed
in decreasing order of their contributions, and as Tol (2011) notes, are ad hoc and
unsatisfactory, because approaches to listing authors vary by discipline - noting that
in economics it is common to list authors alphabetically. It is also difficult to capture
the true contribution with a formula that decreases in a predefined manner.
Tol (2011) introduces a new method using ‘Pareto weights’, where the amount of
credit allocated to an author relates to the probability of that author attaining the
number of citations that the paper in question has attained. Suppose a widely-cited
Professor and a less-cited younger author collaborate on a paper. If that paper
10
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receives many citations, most of the credit flows to the Professor, whilst if the paper
receives relatively few citations, most of the credit will flow to the younger author.
This property could be either an advantage or a disadvantage, but since it relates
the question of attributing credit not to the share of contribution of each author, but
to the response to the paper by the academic community, its validity is not clear-
cut. They note that egalitarian weights are a reasonable approximation to Pareto
weights, and for the purposes of this paper we will assume egalitarian weights as the
method of sharing credit between co-authors.
11
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3 A blockchain solution
The motivation for this paper stemmed from the project UniCoin, as previously men-
tioned, which functions as a decentralized marketplace for licences to use research
for commercial purposes.
UniCoin aims to provide researchers with ownership of their research, and the ability
to grant licences to corporate entities wishing to use their work for commercial
purposes. Where Maree (2020) looks at the pricing of data in a digital marketplace,
here we briefly evaluate the motivation for a blockchain-based platform to do this.
3.1 An introduction to blockchain
A blockchain is an immutable append-only public ledger of transactions which have
been agreed upon through a consensus mechanism by the majority of the participants
in a system. A key property of a blockchain is that it is a decentralized system,
as opposed to centralized (Drescher, 2017). In a centralized system, players in a
network are connected through one central player, who has some element of control or
coordination over the network, whereas in a decentralized system, no one individual
player holds such an element of control.
In a blockchain, the players who maintain the network are referred to as nodes. All
nodes maintain their own copy of the ledger. These nodes control which transactions
are approved, and subsequently recorded in the ledger. These transactions are stored
in ‘blocks’, which are appended to prior blocks, leading to a growing ‘chain’ of
records (Zheng et al., 2017). An illustration of this process from Nakamoto (2008),
whose white paper proposed Bitcoin, is shown in Figure 2. Nodes use a protocol
to make sure that all nodes agree upon which transactions are added to the ledger.
This protocol is referred to as a consensus mechanism: in a centralized system, the
central node could make decisions, whereas in a decentralized system, this protocol
12
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is necessary to ensure that transactions are recorded consistently (Zheng et al.,
2017). Various consensus mechanisms exist: Bitcoin and Ethereum currently use
Proof-of-Work, while Ethereum will be shifting to a Proof-of-Stake protocol.
Figure 2: A simple illustration of a blockchain, from Nakamoto (2008).
Because blockchains are decentralized, they avoid the problem that a single node
can bring the ledger down - the “single point of failure situation” (Zheng et al.,
2017). Because all nodes maintain their own copy of the ledger, for one node to
write fraudulent transactions to the ledger, that node would require a majority of
the computational power in the network - this is referred to as a 51% attack.
Additionally, blockchains are immutable. Since the ledger is append-only, transac-
tions cannot be edited or tampered with once they have been written to the ledger.
This enhances the inherent transparency of such a public ledger.
3.2 Blockchain makes data unique
Data has a few interesting properties that make its economics noteworthy. Firstly,
it is costly and time-consuming to produce, yet since it is cheaply replicable, it has
infinite supply. Whilst data can be copyrighted, it is difficult to track its destina-
13
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tions and uses once it is released. These properties make the ownership of data an
interesting topic and one of vital importance in today’s digital economy.
Blockchains allow data to be registered, recorded as unique, and traced to its origins.
When each transaction is written to the blockchain, it is ‘hashed’ and stored on a
block of transactions, as illustrated in Figure 2. Hashing is to transform data of
arbitrary size into data of fixed size. The hash value is an alphanumeric string
that serves as the ‘digital fingerprint’ of the hashed information. Transactions are
written to a block, and this block is again hashed. Nakamoto’s (2008) solution
involves timestamping each block: this timestamp proves that the data must have
existed at that time, and who it was owned by.
Hashing, timestamping, and the transparency of a public ledger make blockchain
well-suited to record the ownership of assets, more particularly digital assets - which
don’t touch the physical world at all and exist only digitally, since all transactions
involving the hash of the asset can be easily located and verified.
3.3 Licencing research
Research is a valuable asset - it is a form of intellectual property. UniCoin aims
to help academics monetize their research, whilst still maintaining ownership of it.
This differs from the traditional model of publishing in an academic journal, where
typically copyright of the work is transferred to the journal - although, the growing
Open Access movement has resulted in a growing push against this practice (Hoorn
and van der Graaf, 2006). How we do this is through licencing the work. A licence
is an authorization by the owner of the intellectual property to use their research,
whilst not transferring ownership of the IP. This licence can have many special
terms: it can be an exclusive licence to the buyer, or it may be valid only for a
certain period. Through registering all these details on a blockchain, we treat the
14
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licence as a digital asset, which can be bidded on through the UniCoin platform
- this mechanism is investigated further by Maree (2020), who proposes a sealed
bid auction combined with an optional Harberger Tax4 to generate revenue for the
academic’s university.
The transparency provided by the blockchain provides a key benefit to buyers. Sup-
pose an exclusive licence has been sold. The holder of this licence can see any
additional licences, in violation of their agreement with the seller; and prospective
buyers can see that the exclusive licence has already been sold, and they are unable
to purchase their own licence. Every transaction involving the research that has
been registered on the platform can be verified at any point.
How we facilitate the licencing of research is through smart contracts, a key use
case of blockchain technology. These are digital contracts which execute predefined
actions when specified criteria are met. On the UniCoin platform, they can be used
to facilitate the creation of a non-fungible token5 (NFT) that represents a licence to
the use of an academic paper for commercial purposes. Once the prospective buyer
of a licence is granted the licence and pays for it, conditions in the smart contract
are met, a token is minted, and ownership of that token is granted to the buyer.
Ownership of this token needs to be distinguished from ownership of the licence: the
token is the digitally native asset which represents the licence, and as such includes
all licencing details. The tokenized licence entitles the buyer6 to a claim on the
4“An economic policy that aims to find a balance between pure private ownership and total
commons ownership to increase general society welfare and productivity”, from Posner and Weyl
(2017) as cited by Maree (2020).
5A non-fungible token differs from a token like Bitcoin in that tokens are unique and not
mutually interchangeable. Further details around the creation of non-fungible tokenized patent
licences, as well as the smart contracts to facilitate this, are discussed by Maree (2020).
6The buyer can be specified as the only valid licence-holder, as a term of the licence. Alterna-
tively, the holder of the token could be specified to be the valid licence-holder.
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underlying licence, which in turn entitles the licence-holder to use the research for
commercial applications. This is illustrated below in Figure 3.
Figure 3: An illustration of the process to tokenize a licence to rights to use research
with a commercial application.
Additionally, when an academic publishes their paper, they may wish for it to be
open-source and free for research or personal purposes. In the case that a user
downloads the paper for research purposes, and has no wish to commercialize it, the
licence granted to them could include this detail as well, and the right to use the
work for commercial purposes is thus not granted to them. Alternatively, no token
at all could be minted, and in the absence of a hash value that contains the details
of a licence, the downloaded copy of the paper can be clearly distinguished from a
copy that has been provided with the hash value of a legitimate licence. As noted
by Zeilinger (2016), these copies are free to be circulated, as they attest to the value
of the original work, and can potentially impact the value of a licence.
UniCoin uses the strengths of blockchain technology to create a marketplace for
research. We take this further, and trace research outputs to their origins in terms
of the research that influenced it, in a manner that fairly recognizes all parties in
relation to their contribution, to ensure licencing revenues are distributed fairly.
16
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4 Attributing credit between cited papers
4.1 Methodology
Many approaches to attributing credit between coauthors can be taken. The most
effective, but least practical to implement in a credit diffusion mechanism, would be
for authors to actually indicate their respective contributions - no misallocation of
credit between primary and secondary contributors would result.
The second major source of knowledge that deserves to have credit attributed is
the body of work that is cited within a paper. Just as authors contribute different
proportions to the publication of a paper, so too do the papers cited within that
paper - a paper could reference the framework supporting a new theory, or simply
be part of the motivation to conducting the research in question (Fang, 2018).
Fang (2018) represents this in the following form: M authors contribute some pro-







The framework on how to split credit between authors and references has not been
tested empirically. The approach suggested by Fang (2018) is to use content citation
analysis to determine how a reference contributes to a paper - this can influence
how much credit that reference receives. Content citation analysis uses the sentence
surrounding a citation to classify it in certain predefined categories - it can identify
not only how a citation is used, but also why (Ding et al., 2014). All references
can be categorized like this, and then using expert judgement and machine learning
techniques, the distribution of references across various categories can be used to
determine what contribution the authors have made over the references, and hence
determine the size of
∑
αi. To apply the proposed solution is not a trivial task, and
17
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for this reason will not be explored further in this thesis.
In building a mechanism to distribute credit across a citation network, again one
ad hoc solution would be for authors to simply specify what proportion should be
allocated to references. Authors could also specify a third group of individuals, who
are not listed as authors or references, but did also contribute to the paper - such as
lab assistants or colleagues who commented on the work - and the above proportions











This third group of contributors is not one we can easily integrate into our framework
- it would require either analysis of informal collaboration, as in Rose and Georg
(2018), or a manual selection of non-listed contributors by the authors. So, we
don’t delve into this this group further in this thesis, and focus on finding a better
approach to allocate credit between the first two groups, using the structure of the
network. So, we use centrality scores to influence the division between authors and
cited papers.
This division will be influenced by the network of papers surrounding a paper, so the
split is determined for each paper of interest. Calling this paper Paper 0, we define a
paper’s generation in relation to its geodesic distance7 to Paper 0. So, Generation 1
consists of all of the papers which cite Paper 0. Generation 2 consists of all papers
which cite the papers in Generation 1, and so on. Generation -1 consists of all
papers which have been cited by Paper 0. Forward and backward generations are
discussed in more detail by Hu et al. (2011).
A paper which may appear in multiple generations is classified in the closest gen-
7The number of edges in the shortest path between two nodes.
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eration to Paper 0 - so, a paper cited by Paper 0 as well as by another paper in
Generation -1 falls in Generation -1, not Generation -2.
Considering the example citation network in Figure 1 on Page 6, if we take P4 to
be the paper of interest, then Generation 1 consists of P1 and P3, and Generation
-1 consists of P5.
We can compute the centrality scores for each paper in the network, and compare
the scores in Generation -1 with the score of Paper 0. A higher score indicates a
more influential paper - it has received more citations, or more citations from other
influential papers. This higher score indicates that in this network, this paper is
more influential, and should receive a larger share of credit.
The centrality scores for Generation -1 and Paper 0 are discounted. In Generation
-1, papers from a wide range of publication years can appear. Papers which are a
lot older have an unfair advantage, as they are more likely to have attained many
more citations than younger papers. To counteract this, the centrality scores are
multiplied by δ(2019−Ti) where δ is some discount factor (0 < δ < 1)8 and Ti is the
year of publication of paper i. We denote these discounted centrality scores by Yi
for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N where papers 1, 2, ..., N fall in Generation -1.
In this paper, we compare the following centrality measures: eigenvector centrality,
Katz centrality, PageRank, and in-degree centrality, which simply counts the number
of citations a paper has received, and normalizes this.
To decide how much credit is retained with Paper 0, and how much credit is passed
to Generation -1, the average discounted centrality score is computed for Generation
-1. Now, we have two time-adjusted centrality scores, that are in the same scale (of
one paper), and can be compared.
8We use a discount factor of 0.98. Varying this factor between 0.97 and 0.99 changes the
proportion allocated to Paper 0 by less than 1.5%.
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The remainder is allocated to Generation -1. The centrality scores of each paper
influence the proportion they receive. Of the credit that is passed to this generation,




Hence, the total amount of credit that paper i in Generation -1 will receive is














Data were collected from Scopus, Elsevier’s abstract and citation database, using
the pybliometrics Python package from Rose and Kitchin (2019).
There are three potential approaches for defining the scope and breadth of a citation
network, that is to be built from data collected from Scopus. The first is to con-
sider the entire data universe - that is, all 69 million records on Scopus’ database,
and map edges between these nodes and compute the resulting centralities for each
node. This approach is obviously the most rigorous and will result in the most
true representation of the network. However, this approach is not considered due to
computational limitations.
The second approach, a top-down approach, is to define the network based on a
collection of journals and a collection of years of publication. Data from a top per-
centile of journals could be collected for all papers published over a defined period -
e.g. the top 20 economics journals and all papers published in the last 30 years. This
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is more computationally feasible than the prior approach, and ultimately the depth
and breadth of the network can be carefully defined to control for this. Another
advantage of this approach is that by defining one large network, when a smaller
sub-network is viewed, the centralities of the nodes viewed will be in relation to the
entire network, and these centralities will not change depending on what subsec-
tion of the network is being examined. One disadvantage, however, is that through
controlling which journals’ data is included in the network, influential papers or
books which are not published in those journals will be excluded from the network
completely, ignoring that they may in fact be a critical part of the network.
A third approach, which overcomes this disadvantage, is to construct the network
in a bottom-up fashion, whereby a network is constructed directly in relation to a
paper of interest. A paper of interest is selected, and from here all data relating to
papers in a predefined number of generation is collected. Rather than limiting the
amount of data by journals and years, the amount of data is limited in relation to
distance from the paper of interest. So, Generation 1, -1 and -2 can be collected, as
well as all papers collected directly to these generations. To make a more complete
and ‘true’ depiction of the network, data from more generations can be collected.
This is the approach we use for data collection in this thesis.
4.3 Results
Inspired by Tol (2011), we choose to illustrate the results through looking at three
papers by Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University Professor of Economics. To observe
how the results differ by number of authors, number of citations, and age of the
paper, we use the following three papers9:
9Notice how the authors are listed alphabetically - so, if rank weights were used to account for
coauthorship, Shleifer would receive the lowest share in each case.
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• Example 1: A widely cited 2008 paper from the Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, ‘The economic consequences of legal origins’, which has received 1224
citations in Scopus at the time of writing, and is authored by La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer.
• Example 2: A less widely cited 2014 paper from the Journal of Economic
Perspectives, ‘Informality and development’, which has received 171 citations
in Scopus at the time of writing, and is authored by La Porta and Shleifer.
• Example 3: Lastly, a young paper which has had not much time to receive
many citations, ‘Extrapolation and Bubbles’, from the Journal of Financial
Economics, published in 2018, which has received thus far 17 citations in
Scopus and is authored by Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer.
We construct the networks and calculate the centrality scores for all papers in each
network. The networks differ significantly in size: Example 1 consists of 146, 317
nodes, Example 2 of 22, 449 nodes, and Example 3 of 13, 054 nodes.
Some network illustrations are shown: these are not the full networks, which are
too large to visualize, but consist of all nodes in Generations 0, -1, and -2. Each
network is shown below: nodes are scaled by in-degree (number of citations in the
subnetwork), and coloured by generation. Generation 0 is green, Generation -1 is
orange, and Generation -2 is lilac.
Network visualization is done with Gephi from Bastian et al. (2009), and nodes are
positioned using the Force Atlas force-directed layout.
Since these are still quite large visualizations, more interactive versions are online
at https://lukemeiklejohn.github.io/#thesis
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Figure 4: Generations 0, -1, and -2 for Example 1.
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Figure 5: Generations 0, -1, and -2 for Example 2.
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Figure 6: Generations 0, -1, and -2 for Example 3.
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In the cases of Figure 4 and Figure 6, there are cases of small communities which are
noticeably distinct from the rest of the network. In the case of Example 3, there are
two papers in Generation -1 which have resulted in three clusters of papers separate
from the network.
These two papers are:
• ‘Simultaneous modeling of visual saliency and value computation improves pre-
dictions of economic choice’ by Towal, Mormann, and Kock
• ‘Neuroeconomic foundations of economic choice-recent advances’ by Fehr and
Rangel
Both papers are significantly more scientific than the rest of the papers cited by
Paper 0, which are more traditionally economic - and so, it makes sense for these
communities of papers to be separate from the rest of the network.
The centrality scores for each of the Paper 0s are as follows:
Katz centrality In-degree centrality Eigenvector centrality PageRank
Example 1 0.06590 0.00119 0.00441 0.00016
Example 2 0.03163 0.00098 0.00019 0.00011
Example 3 0.13642 0.00329 0.11004 0.00095
Table 1: Centrality scores for the paper of interest in each of the named examples.
The varying scales are interesting to note (in Example 3, the paper of interest has
the highest centrality scores in the table above, due to it being in a much smaller
network); however, what is more valuable is to compare these scores in relation to
the rest of each network.
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As an example, we can view for Example 3 an excerpt of the rankings in terms of
their discounted centrality scores below. These rankings are constructed based on
the most influential papers which are cited by Paper 0. More information on each
of the papers in Table 2 are given in Appendix A.
Paper ID PageRank In-degree Katz eigenvector
7 1 1 1 3
10 2 2 4 •
37 3 4 7 •
14 4 6 • •
16 5 3 2 2
13 6 5 • •
18 7 7 • •
41 • • 3 4
17 • • 5 1
3 • • 6 5
33 • • • 6
22 • • • 7
Table 2: An excerpt of the ordinal rankings of papers in terms of centrality scores.
Initial results reveal very similar rankings for the PageRank and in-degree centrality
measures. Katz centrality appears somewhat similar, whilst eigenvector centrality
has the least similar rankings to the other three measures.
Whilst the rankings in terms of centrality are interesting to compare, it is more
telling to compare the allocations of credit across the network. The allocations
given to the Paper 0s are given in Table 3 below. Note, that this is the amount of
credit allocated to the paper, not the author. This allocation will be split further to
account for coauthorship of each paper. We allocate credit at a paper level and then
correct for multiple authorship, rather than allocating credit at a researcher level,
which causes mis-allocation of credit (Wang et al., 2016).
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PageRank In-degree centrality Katz Eigenvector centrality
Example 1 71.02% 85.84% 95.53% 99.37%
Example 2 23.75% 53.95% 74.28% 95.74%
Example 3 43.79% 49.21% 84.55% 97.75%
Table 3: Credit allocations given to the central paper in each of the examples, guided
by the centrality score named.
Two immediate points of interest are that for Example 1, with 1224 citations, all
centrality measures guide a majority of the credit to the paper of interest. This is
a desirable trait! Secondly, that eigenvector centrality appears to always result in
almost all credit being attributed to the paper of interest: this bias is a weakness, and
in directed acyclic graphs such as citation networks, eigenvector centrality results in
the problem of zero centrality. Nodes with no in-edges have a centrality of zero, and
any node that has only one in-edge from that node also has a centrality of zero. This
problem is made clear in Table 3, where many nodes have very small centrality, and
hence eigenvector centrality is not suitable for use in a platform such as UniCoin.
Katz Centrality is a useful adaptation that can be used instead.
Where the ordinal rankings by PageRank and in-degree centrality are almost identi-
cal, their credit allocations vary significantly: only Example 3 has somewhat similar
credit allocations for the paper of interest. Katz centrality still results in larger
credit allocations for each of the papers.
For each of the networks, we plot below in Figures 7, 8, and 9 the credit allocations
for each of the papers in the respective Generation -1. The full data are available
here, as mentioned in Appendix B.
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Figure 8: Credit allocations for each of the papers in Example 2’s Generation -1.
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Figure 9: Credit allocations for each of the papers in Example 3’s Generation -1.
These three graphs essentially show the other side of Table 3: while PageRank results
in the lowest share of credit for the paper of interest out of the three measures, it
is the most generous method for attributing credit to cited papers. Likewise, the
opposite is true for Katz centrality, and in-degree centrality consistently allocates
credit somewhere between the other two measures. Out of these three measures, it
could be said that in-degree centrality is thus the most ‘fair’ - neither too generous to
cited papers, nor too generous to the paper of interest. By the principle of Occam’s
razor, simply using number of citations as the mechanism to diffuse credit may thus
in fact be the best way.
If number of citations is a good proxy for measuring impact in the network, the
PageRank results are slightly inconsistent. For Example 2, the paper of interest
has received 171 citations, while the average paper in Generation -1 has received
21 citations. The paper of interest only receives 23.75% of the credit here, whilst
in Example 3, the paper of interest has only received 17 citations compared to the
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average paper in Generation -1 with 35 citations, and receives 43.79% of the credit.
This dilemma is repeated with the results from using Katz centrality.
One limitation of these results is the size of each of the generations of cited papers.
Whilst the papers of interest in Example 1 and 3 cite 174 and 42 papers respectively,
the paper of interest in Example 2 only cites 22 papers. Thus, this paper is only
connected directly to 39 papers, and this may explain the anomalies with PageRank
and Katz centrality.
In empirical work by Litvak et al. (2007), a relationship between the tails of a
website’s PageRank and its in-degree was found - that the distributions of these
centrality scores follow power laws with the same exponent. A power law says that
Pr[X > x] ≈ x−α. This result is in line with our results, which show that for
cited papers, the manner in which credit is allocated is very similar, only the scale
differs. PageRank not only grows with in-degree, but there is a significant correlation
between the two measures - Fortunato et al. (2006) devises a method to approximate
PageRank from in-degree for the purposes of ranking websites, as in the results of
an internet search query. This approximation for the purposes of ranking bears a
striking resemblance to our results - recall that our ranking of papers in Table 2 for
the results from in-degree was incredibly similar to the ranking from PageRank.
Comparing Katz centrality with some other centrality measures through similar em-
pirical work, Bloch et al. (2016) found that with a low decay factor, Katz centrality
acts as a very similar measure of centrality to degree. For very small parameter
values, Katz centrality scores are mostly influenced by short paths, such as paths
of length one - that is, in-degree. As the decay factor increases, Katz centrality
incorporates more information from longer paths rather than just a node’s imme-
diate neighbours, and starts to differ more significantly. We did not experiment
with variations of this parameter, but hypothesise that if we were to decrease it, the
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allocations would be more similar to the allocations by in-degree centrality, and less
similar if we were to increase it. Tuning the Katz centrality decay parameter for our
application is one potential area of future research.
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5 Conclusion
This thesis uses citation networks to develop a mechanism to fairly attribute credit
amongst sources of knowledge that result in the creation of an academic publication.
We share credit between the authors of a paper, and all papers cited, as well as
allow for a third group of contributors: those who traditionally would not receive
credit, such as lab assistants or informal collaborators. Through three empirical
case studies based on papers by Andrei Shleifer, we find that Katz centrality and
PageRank are useful network centrality measures that can be used for this credit
diffusion mechanism, and that surprisingly, in-degree centrality is also a very strong
contender for this application.
All three measures result in slightly different allocations of credit across the network,
and whilst each of the results presented can be considered fair, it is a more esoteric
task to ask which of these allocations is most fair: this is a task that would need
to be conducted with a more finely tuned knowledge of the subject domain and a
knowledge of how the paper of interest contributes to the domain in comparison to
how the cited papers do. Indeed, this brings us back to the approach suggested by
Fang (2018) using content citation analysis, machine learning, and expert judgement,
as mentioned in Section 4.1.
We discussed why blockchain technology should be harnessed for an academic li-
cencing application: it allows academics to retain ownership of their intellectual
property, while using smart contracts to issue NFTs that function as licences. This
licencing platform can be combined with the credit diffusion mechanism discussed
to ensure that licencing revenue is distributed fairly in a manner that recognizes all
contributors in proportion to their contribution.
Future work can involve integrating this credit diffusion mechanism into UniCoin:
for this thesis, we used data that were already uploaded onto Scopus, and because of
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this, mapping edges from a paper to its cited papers was a fairly easy task. To add
value, the platform should be able to scrape any arbitrary paper and extract the cited
papers from it, before linking those papers to their Scopus data and constructing the
citation network. The visualisation element can also be integrated into the UniCoin
website: what we have shown in this thesis serves as a proof of concept, but in the
final product it should be possible for any paper to be selected or uploaded, and the
citation network constructed as well as visualized.
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A Full paper details from Table 2
Note: Not all of this data was available/correct on Scopus. Some manual data
correction was done below, but this was not required for the thesis and was done
purely to provide complete information here.
Paper ID EID10 Paper Title Authors Publication Year
7 2-s2.0-4043089417 Hedge funds and the tech-
nology bubble
Brunnermeier & Nagel Journal of Fi-
nance
2004
10 2-s2.0-84877974019 What have they been think-
ing? Homebuyer behavior







37 2-s2.0-0001575872 Asset bubbles and overlap-
ping generations
Tirole Econometrica 1985
14 2-s2.0-84904437662 Two pillars of asset pricing Fama Am. Econ. Rev. 2014
16 2-s2.0-0004320711 The Great Crash: 1929 Galbraith None 1954
13 2-s2.0-84977712440 Positive Feedback Invest-









18 2-s2.0-85021799760 An extrapolative model of
house price dynamics









17 2-s2.0-84969217968 No-Bubble Condition:





3 2-s2.0-0004058553 Lombard Street: A Descrip-
tion of the Money Market
Bagehot None 1873
33 2-s2.0-0004179594 Irrational Exuberance Shiller None 2000
22 2-s2.0-85049295829 Hoard Behavior and Com-
modity Bubbles






10These are the unique identifiers assigned to academic works in the Scopus database.
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B Data and code
All data and code are available on the following GitHub repository:
https://github.com/lukemeiklejohn/HowToAttributeCredit
There are three folders, namely:
• Figures, containing all named figures from this document.
• Code, containing Python code (in the form of Jupyter notebooks) for Scopus
scraping and data processing.
• Data, containing processed data from Excel, as well as the Gephi network files.
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